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.WIRIC!N FAR WTEJW POLICY. 
In the matters or foreisn policy, the Ame~can people are generally 
more concerned with the affairs of Europe than with those of Asia . Thie 
emphasis is not difficult to understand. Most ot us are deecendents of 
Europeans . Our political institutions derive largely from Europe; and 
strong economic and cultural bonds link the Oni ted States to that con-
tinent. Perhape most important, the European countries have provided a 
powerful thrust in the shaping of recent world histo~, . so that isolation 
fro~ their influence--for good or for evil--has not been po8sible for ue . 
In the years that lie ahead, Europe is likely to remain for a long time 
the _rinoipal focus of American concern in foreign affairs . 
n .e time has come, however, to give increased coll8ideration to our 
POsition and policies in the Far Eaet. For, while our attention has been 
concentrated on Europe, the drive of American civili1ation has been oarry-
ing us steadily westward; first acroea a continent to the Pacific; then 
beyond, to the ocean islands; and finally, to the shores of Asia where we 
now occupy Japan with a force of more than 100, 000 Americans. 
This westward projection of the Onited States is a development tilat 
dates from the eerliest days of the Republic . During most of the 19th 
Century, however, it found expression within the continen~l limits of 
North America in the forging_of the nation. In the Far East at the time , 
our ajor concern was the safety of our missionaries and the rights o! 
our shippers and traders . Even these limited interests , however, led us 
to initiate the opening of Japan by Admiral perry. 
After 1900, American interest& in the Pacific began to spread and 
multiply. The recent war, of course , precipitated this process; and today, 
we are plunged aore deeply in the Far last than ever before. There it 
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little likelihood that our involvement will diminish in the tutur nd every 
indication, that it will increase. We re, even at thi oaent, consider! 
a new Aid-plan for China. 
To meet the situntion in which we now find ourselves in the far P oifio, 
it is imperative th t we develop end apply intelligent Far Eastern policies . 
This is not a sillple assignment. The region is i1111ense and extre ely complex. 
China, Japan, torea , Southern and Southeast Asia--while they oont in anr 
factors in common with which we must reckon--also present us with individual 
problems of foreign relations . They are , in effect, separate challenges to 
our reaourcefullnese which must be met with aepar te responses . But even 
aore, these specific policies must be devised within the pattern of our 
universal foreign polia,y wlich1 stated generally, is to provide adequstely 
for the security of the United States; to preserve world peace; and to 
establish mutually beneficial commercial and cultural relations with the 
other nations of the world . 
•n the remainder of the discussion, I propose to consider briefly thoae 
principal sub-divisions of the Far East which I have mentioned ~nd the couree 
of our relations with each of them. These are the components, the main div-
isions, of what is termed American Far Eastern policy. 
China is or major imports.nce . It 18 the country with which we have 
~ intnined the longest, and in some respects , the most significant rolations. 
Our Chinese policy has evolved slowly over the course of a century. Tradi-
tionally, it has bean based on such concepts as the •open Door• and the main-
tenance of China's •ind~pendence and territtrial integrity. • . This policy 
was adequate while con~~ets with China were linited nnd •• •ere primarily 
interested in the protection of commercial interests . It was a comparatively 
simple and inexpensive policy to operate. 
However, the rapid ascendancy or Japan to dominance in ~st As1 !ter 
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orld ·ar I challenged the "Open Door" nnd China's "independence and terri-
torial integrity.•. FurtherMore. it became increasingly evident--especially 
after the invasion of Manchuria in 1931--that not only the business interests 
of A~ericen nationRls in China were menaced by Japan's actions but the very 
security of our country was involved. Succeoeive Secretaries of State--in 
Democr~tic and RepUblican administrations alike--sought through •arioua meana 
to blunt the headlong rush of Japanese sggression and to reassert the tradit-
ional pattern of our policy in China. It was only after the shattering of 
this policy that Japan entered irrevocably on the patch ihat led to the War 
in the Pacific. 
The end of the recent conflict found us more deeply involved in China 
than at any other time in history. With our soldiers atill scattered through-
out Cnina and with continuing commitments to the Central Government, immediate 
withdrawal was impossible. Furthermore our hopes for world peace were based 
in part on the belief thnt a strong and independent Chinn could aot as a 
s~bilizing influence in Bust Asia. But Chinn, exhausted by the war, was on 
the verge of economic collapse and in imminent danger of renewed civil war. 
Under these ciroums~~nces, it was evident that we could not easily 
revert to the prewar pattern of our Chine policy. Elaboration was essential 
to meet the new situation and it was forthcoming in a statement by President 
Truman on December 16• 1945. In thio pronouncement, the Preeident called 
for a "strong, united and democratic China." He 5aid that the United States 
would continue to recognize the Central Goyernment and to cooperate with it 
internationally, but thut we would not intervene m111taril7 "to influence tiB 
course of any Chinese strife." In addition, the President held out the promise 
of Amerioan aid as the Chinese moved towards peace and unity. General Marshall 
was sent to China to assist in furthering this policy. 
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For the y r th t he served in China, the ener 1 ought through ed-
i tion to bring about a •Strong, un1 ted end democr ic Chinn. •. arshall• 
oat determined efforts, however, proved unavniling in the face of t enty 
years of mutual hatred, aietrust and suspicion on the part of the Chin se 
tuo intang and Co unist lenders. Our attempts to promote a settlement 
earnest us nothing but the ounting hostility of large sections of the war-
we ry Chinese people who vented the bitterness of their frustrated hopes 
for peace on the pencemakers. 
Since General Marshall's return, early in 1947, the United tates has 
continued to support Generalissimi C~iang lai-shek'e Government in inter-
national matters, giving him diplomatic backing ugainst F~ssia on the repar-
a tiona issue in Manchuria and on the question of restoring Chin se sover-
eignty in the ei ties of Dairen and Port Arthur . At the sa.me tiae we haTe 
sought, as far as possible to extricate ourselves from the civil war situation. 
In other words, the United states had not changed its policy of deairing a 
"strong, united and democratic China , " but Wt!B awaiting a more propitious 
moment for furthering it • . 
In recent months, however, the oltuution in China has been growing very 
tense. The position of the Central Government h~s deteriorated very rapidly. 
Production is at a pEactical standstill. Inflation, speculation nnd food 
shortages--particularly in the large citiee--h~ve occaa61oned severe hard-
ships for the Cbinese people. Inefficiency r;,nd corruption corrode the 
chinery of government and incompetent officers and inadequate organication 
devitalise the army. 
Chinese Communists now hold most of Utmchuria and are becoming stronger 
throughout North China. A massive struggle for power goes on, and the eo on 
people of Chin&, whose strongest yearning is for peace, are steadily crushed 
by an .ver -increasing weight of economic chaos and military devastation. 
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The question, which naturally ari:Jea, is whether or not there is any-
thing ~~~t can be done to alleviate the sit tion. More e,eeifieally, is 
there anything we can do? Any attempt to answer U1is question ohould begin 
with a consideration of what we have alre dy done. Sinoe 1937 we have made 
available loans and grants totaling $3 billion. Of this a. ount, almost half 
has been extended since V-J day. In addition, we hnve transferred to the 
Chinese at · fraction of cost large quantities of surplus properties includ-
ing some arms and munitions, and provided a nuoleous o! 271 s•all ships for 
the Chinese navy. 
There is now under consideration a China equivalent of the E.R.P. which 
the State Department estimates will cost $570 million through June 30, 1949. 
If the plan is adopted, the Central Government will be given loans and grants, 
not for military equipment and sup)lies , but to check the disintegration of 
~~e civilinn economy, to bring some direct relief to the bard-pressed populaoe. 
$60 million~! the total is earmnrked !or the rehabilitation--particularly 
of tr nsportation-in nre~a removed from the civil war zones. In bh trans-
mi ttal of the program, the :President emphasized that it WRS not intended as 
e. cure-all !or China • s ill:s. In hi a own words, "The proposed program ot aid. 
to China represents what I believe to be the beat course this Government can 
follow in the light of all the circumstances. Nothing which this country 
provides by way o£ assistance oa.n, even in a sm&ll measure, be a substitute 
for the necessary action that can be taken only,ibe Chinese Government.• 
The assistance which we are extending through various channels to the 
Chinese is not inconsider&ble but there has been, nevertheless, oome dem~nd 
for more •positive" help. •Pooitive," in this sense, means of course, grants 
of guns and ammunition for the Central Government. 
However laudatory the objective of fighting Communists may be, let us 
examine just two of the many pos ible ramifications of such ~ "positive• 
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liey. In the first pl ce, we uat recoaniz hon tly tb t 111te.ry !.d 
would &lmo~t certainly lead to the return of American troop in ever-incr s-
ing numbers to Chinese soil. first as instructors, then as advisors nd 
technicians and ulti tely perhaps as combattants . In tr.ie conn otion, let 
me reo ll the wide-spread demonstr tions ~gainet the presence of American 
troops in China during the late 1946 and early 1947--troop which were there 
for the peaceful purpose of attempting to meintain the Nationalistic-Commun-
ist truce. What would be the reaction of the war-weary Cbin ae people if 
the function of American soldiers in China were expressly to aosist on 
faction in the civil strife agdnst the other? 
In the second place, such a program of •positivew aid would flaunt 
arrogantly two of the strongest sentiments of the Chinese-n t1on~l1sm nnd 
the desire to'r peace. .Lt would place U8 in the unenviable position which 
General Marshall has urged us to avoid--that ian of being ch rged with a direct 
responsibility for the conduct ot the Chinese Government and its political, 
economic and military affairs . " 
If we •~bark on such a course, we must be prepared to t&ke on for our-
selves the same heritage of hatred the Russians are constructing for them-
eel vee in Dairen and Port Arthur. 
If we wish to avoid this reaction, we can do little more, at present, 
th n to ansist, through whatever peaceful avenues are open to us in the 
alleviation of human miaery nnd in checking economic d1eentegrat1on. e 
cannot, however, add to the phycical wreckage and the slaughter or fratricidal 
atrife and expect to bo thanked for our troUble. 
In contrast with China, where our course is deteroined by ourselves 
along on the basis of n long historical experience, the pattern of the 
American occup tion of Japan deriveo fror. inter-Allied &greement and con-
stitutes a new raaification in our Far Eastern policy. 
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The broad aim of the Occupation is to insuro th~ establishment of a 
peaceful, de~oeratic Japan, able and willing to cooperate in building e 
ste bl~ world. The means by which we propose to bring this change about were 
sta ted broadly ~n the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945, adhered to b,y 
the m~jor Allie~. They include the full demilitarization and democratization 
of Japan. They do not include the erm~nent ensl~vement of the Japanese 
people or the tot~l deet~ot .. o of the Jspaneee industrial economy. 
In the creation of machinery to carry out the purposes of the Occupation, 
the United States ~ought to preserve the leadership which·we hnd exercised 
throughout the war in the racific and, at the same time, to give adequate 
recognition to the interests of the other A!liea who participated in the 
struggle. The appointment of Generg,l MacArthur as Supreme Co'Ulllander of the 
Allied Powers--of SCAP as it is abbreviated--to accept the surrender, insured 
the continuity of our primary war poaition into the Peace. Our ~llies share 
in the occupation through nn Allied advisory body which works with General 
acArthur in Tokyo and through an eleven-member Far Eastern Commission which 
meets here in Washington. The latter body h~s authority to formulate occu-
p~tion policy, but its powers are circumscribed in such a manner as to in-
sure the eontinuP.nce of the dominant influence of the Oni ted SVJ.tes in both 
policy formulation and execution. 
Thjs primacy, however, carries with it corresponding responsibilitiee, 
heavy, both in terms of eostr. and effort and in terms of the future peace 
of the P oi!io. It is incumbent upon UG to attempt to transform a feud~l 
Japan into a new State capable of pe ceful nnd progressive eurviwal in the 
modern world. The basic measures through whi ch we hope to carry out this 
re3ponsibil1ty--that is, the SCAP directives, deeigned to work far-reaching 
changes in the military, politic~l, economic and social structure of Japnneee 
eoclety--have been pro~ulgated. Our ~njor re~ining task io to see thet they 
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are carried out. 
The greatest progress in implementAtion i discerneble in t.. field 
of demilitarization. Japan's capacity to wage ~ar has been practically 
obliterated through tile physical destruction of military mc.terial; the de ob-
iliz~tion of the armed forces; the purge from public life and in some c Des, 
the criminal triel, of w~r leadftrs. 
Political reform in Japan has m~de considerable gains. A new con-
stitution 1s now in operation, embodying n very liberal "Bill of Riehta". 
It establishes a oound legal basis upon which .~ genuine de ooratic government 
can bo constructed. An interesting feature of the Constitution ie the renun-
ciation by Japan of tile right to maintain either an Army or Navy. 
SCft%'s economic directives nre de~igned to break up exces~ive coneen-
tratione of power and to diversify the control of Japan's wealth. easures 
have been introduced to eliminate the monopolies of the Zaibatsu--the great 
family trusts, and to spre~d the ownership of land and industry, Both 
trade unionism nnd agricultural cooperatives have been encouraged and h ve 
experienced a phenomenal growth. 
These measures, h .. ever, are not nde~uate to establish a self-support-
ing Jnpan. With 1"- population of,. million now compressed into an rea 
roughly e~ual in size to Montana nnd fttr less opulent, Japan must develop s. 
slbstantial foreign trade or remain a permanent o~rge on the United S tatee. 
While SCAP is making determined efforts to incre~se Japaneae exports, ~~e 
problem is tn extre~ely difficult one. Many of the Allied members of the 
FarE stern Co~~ission fear the oocpetition of Jap n's industry bro d, par-
ticularly in textiles; there are unsettled demands for reparations which leave 
the Japanese uncertain ss to which lines of production to develop; and 
finally, the de::l:.lnd for the moct importnnt Japanese export--raw sillt-h s 
been drastically curtailed by the growth in the world-use of synthetics. 
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It may be that thf! genuine rehnbilitntion of tho e:x.port trade must nweit 
the signing of n jJeacc treP-t • This evAnt, however, could be long delayed. 
On July 11, 194'7, the United Stutes proposed a conference of the membarB of 
the F~tr .En.stern Cotll!lis:.>ion to di8cuss the terns of a pence settler:ent. But 
Rus.tia hss denounced the lrocedure proposed nnd Chinn h .!? exprecsec some 
reservations. 
In the field of soci-1 reforn, the moat im:10r~nt OCAP directiveg 
seek extensive redirection of Ja~nese educ~tion; the abolition of State 
Shintoi~--that is eoperor worship; end the equalizing of the gtatus of women. 
With respect to the latter, I ~ght mention thnt women have bAen elected to 
the Diet for the first ti~e in Japanese history. 
To all outward ap•enrances, tl1e Anericnn oceup~tion of J pan h~~ been 
a grant success. The foundations for !1. pe::tceful a nd rle.nocra.tia Japan have 
been fir~ly esUlblished. While the Jap~nese give every indic~tion of approv-
ing the many changes introduced, there is no accurate me sure for determin-
ing how deep-seated their acc~ptnnce hao been. 
In the long run, whether democracy flourishes in Jspan depends upon 
the Japanese people thenselves, on the one hrmd, and the United tates ond 
the United Nations on th" other. The former must der.1onstrete the eternal 
vigilence so e3Jential to the preservation of a free society. For ourselves, 
we must end the occupation as quic .. d:r es :?0!3sible and then ;~inbin P. care-
ful su~ervision over Japen to prevent a recrudescence of a militArism which 
might once again be turned upon ua. At the 5'!!11e time, we must continue. 
together with the other United Nations, to str!Te for the sort of world in 
which Japan osn ~rovide itoelf with decent living ntandards ~~rough normal 
trade; and unarmed, ntand es a symbol of the cau city of the United Nations 
to preserve pence, r ther thl\n ae an open invitation to invasion by 
aggressors 
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Our occupation o! [orea may best be described as a reluctant one. 
entered the southern half of the country at the conclusion of the r to diw-
arm the Japanese forces there and to provide an interim admini tr tion. t 
the same time, the Rus6ians advanced into the north. The 38th p rallel 
I 
latitude was intended as e temporary, convenient line or division, firs or 
military end then of temporary administrative reftponsibilities. We hoped 
thAt a provisional, all-Korean government could be established quickly and 
that, in due course, *h' full independence o! Korea would follow. But for 
two and a half years , the Korean people have waited !or the promiaed inde-
pendence or at least a unified provisional Government. They have received 
neither. Instead, they have witnessed the militney division of their country 
grow into a rigid political partition. The economic effects of the cl v ge 
at the JSth parallel have been catastrophic . The equalibrium between the 
industrial north and the agr:cultural south hga been distorted; ~nd Korea, 
which as a unit, could be reasonably self-supporting, now finds itsolf cut 
into two insufficient segments . The da~Re is probably more severe in the 
American zone, since the normal population there has been swelled by en 
influx of several million refugees from the north and from Japan. 
For two yeP.rs the United states adhered to a policy of se king the tm-
mediate breakdown of the unnaturel economic barrier through the middle of the 
country, nnd of promoting a u!Ufied, democratic, !11-Korenn goTernment. Vur 
efforts , in both instances, were completely blocked by the Soviet Union. The 
Russians sealed themselves within ~~eir zone nnd frustrcted negotiations on 
the formation of an interim government by refusing to consider the inclusion 
in it of any Korean litical groups other than those approved by the Co~unist1 . 
In the fnll of 1947, the United tates admitted, in effect, that 
bilateral negotiations with the Ruagiana could t~t solve the Korean dilemma 
when it requested U1e U. N. Assembly to cotsider the proble3. Over strong 
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Soviet opposition, the United Nations dispatched Commission to ~rea with 
a view to supervising the holding of elections in both zones preliminary 
to the formation of a unified government. The Conmission was welcomed in 
the South. Its request to enter the r orth wt~.s ignored. Inst4Jad, the auth-
ority of the U. N. body was flaunted by the Co1JII'llunista who were reported to 
be forming in the Northern Zone an •all-lorean People's Republic . • 
The Oni ted States is also considering the formation of a separate 
government in the Southern aone . the arguments in favor of the plan are 
besed in part on the contention th t since the outh contains two thirds ot 
the population, a government for tbe area would have a strong legal basis 
for claiming to represent the entire country. A majority of the members 
of the United Nations Commission on Korea, however, do not believe that 
such a step at this time would contribute to the unity or independence of 
the Korean people, but, nevertheless , the Little Assembly has ordered the 
Com ission to supervise elections in the south . 
The United Staten aust fnoe the fact that if the Russians withdr w 
their occupation forces in accordance with their announced intention, there 
will be left behind a well-organised North Korean communist government and 
a large, communist-dominated army. Our poai tion in the South then would be 
extremely eri tical. To continue the status-quo of mili tart adminbtra tion 
while ~waiting a possible all-Korean solution might well provoke the hostility 
of the Korean people. The Korean communiets undoubtedly will point out that 
si&ee Russia hae withdrawn, only imperialiet America stands in the way of 
full independence and eelf-government. lfe have no right to asl'!ume that the 
Koreans in the South ore leas likely to accept this explanation of the sit-
ua tion than our own. 
On the other hand, we may withdraw our forces at once. In that c ae , 
the well-organised and armed minority in the north could probably seiee con-
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trol of the South and destroy the possibilities of forming a genuine de o-
cratic Government. 
The other alternative 1 to proceed immediate~ with the formation of 
a representative government in the South. We should be aw re before we 
initiate such a government however, of what the undert_king entails if it is 
to be more than a 11ere gesture. It would mean, first of all, econonrl.c 
assistance on a far greater scale than the present "disease and unrest" 
appropriations. Unless the economic ills are corrected ~nd the area is 
rendered reasonably self-sufficient, the existence ot a South Korean gov-
eruaaaD would depend upon American mUi tary backing. In addition, firm ste}W 
will have to be taken to root our the corruption which has seeped into the 
(orean civil service and to end the free reign of extre~e rightist nd leftist 
terrorism which has already ol~imed the lives of two outstanding moderate 
leaders by assaaaination. 
In sharp contrast to the ohaoa and instability which extends over so 
much of Asia and the Far last , the Philippines are far advanced in inteunal 
rehabilitation and have achieved a distinct and independent p e in inter-
national society . Iet a year and a half ago, on July 4, 1946, when the 
independence of the Islands was proclaimed, there were many who ~ueetioned 
the wisdom of the act. The Philippines had been burned and gutted by some 
of the most intense combat of the entire war. Many of itA cities were in 
ruins . Production was at a st!mdstill. Law l!.nd order had largely broken 
down in aa~ sections of the country. 
In the faee ot these multiple obstacles, the Philippines have staged 
ifi t co • It is significant that this year a balanced budget a magn oen recoovery 
has been achieved and the largest ite= is tor education. The gre t measure 
of credit for this co ebaok, of course, is due to the Philipino people. t . ey 
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have demonstrated a capacity for persistent, constructive endeavor under 
their own leadership. But some amnll part of it is due, perhaps, to the 
cooperative policy which we are followin~ with respect to the Islands. 
This policy, a natural outgrowth of our 48-year relationship with the 
Philip~inee and the deep sympathetic interest of the A~eriean people in 
their welfare, has been given a number of tangible expressions. Various 
legislation has been passed by the Congress approprie.ting more than half-
a-billion doll~rs for reconstruction and rehabilitation. Considerable 
quantities of surplus property has been transferred to the Philippines; and 
a preferential trade act was passed by the previous Congress which will 
permit a gradual transition of the Philippine to a more balanced economy. 
The policy of cooperation with the Philippines is a long- term one. 
It extends into the international field, where we are •orking together 
through a military base agreement to provide for our mutual security and 
in the Oni ted Na tiona for the peace end general well-being of the world. 
The fact that our policy of cooperation led to the successful launch-
ing of the Philippines as an independent S~~te has had its profoundest re-
percussions in the last section of tbe Far East whict I shall consider--
'outhern and South-eastern Asia. 
This vast rich nrea of many races and more than half a billion h~an 
beings, is, in the fullest sense, the frontier of our Far Eastern Policy. 
Prior to World War I we had few contacts of a01 kind with the region; and 
even up until the outbreak of the recent conflict our major concern was with 
certain key commodities such as petroleum, rubber, tin, and quinine, im-
portant both to our domestic econonsy and to world tr&.de in general. Poli t. 
leal control of the area was largely in the hands of the European colonial 
powers and we did not ouestion the arrangements . 
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However, the needs of the war witb J pan nd develo enta inoe v-J 
day hnvo compelled a more c retul conside tion or our relation thSouthern 
and Southeast Asia. 
A base tor our policy w1 th the are waa established by Cordell Bull 
on March 21, 1944. The eoretary or otate declareda 
"There rests upon the independent nations ft 
re~poneibility in regard to 'dependent peoples' who 
aspire to liberty. It should be the duty of na.tiona 
rAving political ties with nuoh ople ••• to h lp the 
aspiring peoples to develop terially and educationAll1 
to pre~re themselves for the duties and renponn1b1l-
1ties or self-government, and to attain liberty.' 
Since the end or the wnr, we have in general sought to exp nd this bllae, with-
out however, challenging directly the uihority or the Colonial Powers who 
exercise legal aovereillltY in various of the territories. This policy hae 
been expressed primarily through full cooperation with those apeoialized and 
su&sidiar,y u. N. agencies concerned with the econoaic and social bettarment 
of the region. An interesting development bAs been the nego~iation of a 
nUIPer of 8ir-transport agreements which permit ou• irlines to link the 
great cities o! ~outhern and .;>outheast Asia with our own for the first time. 
In politic~l matters, our policy has been extremely cautious. With 
those countries whoetdindependence is of long-standing or far dvanoed ~~rough 
constitutional rocesses, we are, at present, eetabliahing ore intimate 
And cordial relations. Thus, in the ease or Siam, Nepal, Burm , India and 
Pakistan, cultural and. coMeroial contncta are bein~ enlarged. 
1re nre faced with difficult deoinione of policy in bo Southeast 
Asisn countries--Indo Chin and Indonesia. Both of these res htv fl red 
into r volt ag~inat the return of the ~rewar colonial powers. t first 
we sought to nsintain a policy of non-involvement. However, uch 
particularly in the case ot Indoneda, soon bee me illlpossible. A eric n 
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equipment tr nr.ferred originally for u:~e in the war gainst Japan, was being 
used by the Dutt.h against the Indonesiens in an effort to reotore their 
aut~ority. Furthermore, the conflict was of large comp ss and seriously 
impaired the flow of critically ne ded r w materials. Most significant 
in the long run perhaps, was the open manifestation of sympathy for the 
Republican cause on the part of many neighboring countries, particularly 
India, the Philippines and ustralia. These nations were cloaely watching 
our attitude with respect to the Indonesian situation. 
In devising policies to meet the situation the United States has had 
to consider our rela tionsbip with the betherlands and the importnnce of that 
country in Western Europe. At the same time it h&s been ~mpossible for u~ 
to ignore the rising tide of nationalism in the East. Under the ciro~­
stanoes, a middle course has been attempted. We have acknowledged the 
Justice of Indonesian aspirations for freedom but have urged a pacific 
settlement of the dispute which would protect legitimate Dutch interest•• 
It is still too early to determine how suocesaful tbie policy has been 
since the entire question is before the Security Council of the United 
Nations. 
In our relations with all the areas which I have considered, a oommon 
thece is evident. We are seeking, in general, the gradual evolution of 
peaveful , stable and democratic societies in the ll'ar Jloast and the mainten-
ance with them of friendly and mutually advantageous relations. In a broader 
aspect, we want these countries to be economically and politioallf capable 
of sharing with us and with other nations the reepon3ibilit1es or building 
a secure and prosperous world society. 
The course which we have set for ourselves in the l'ar -Cast ie essen-
tially a cooperative one and it takes into consideration the dignity and 
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rights of the peoples with whom we come into contact. It i not an o sy 
course to follow. The going will become even more difficult e.s our involv-
ements deepen but we must persist in it. To do ao will require patience in 
tbe face o! mnny problems and provocations. e must reconcile the cours o! 
cooperation with the legitimate security needs of the United St tea in the 
.Fnr East. We 11ust harmonize 1 t 11. th our policies in other pnrts of the world . 
We must defend it from opponents both inside and outside the United 
States. 
But we munt, £•t all costs, follow the we.y of coopern tion not only in 
Asia and the Far East, but everywhere in the world. The only lternativee 
are imperialism or isolationism. Imperialism ia abhorrent to every premise 
upon which our free societr stands. Isolationism becomes , at best, extremely 
perilous when we are scarcely 24-hours airtime distence from Tokyo, Hong 
Kong or Manila . 
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